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This study aims at analyzing the impact of the European integration process on Kurdish
nationalism in Turkey by focusing on the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik
Toplum Partisi, DTP) as the major pro-Kurdish political party in Turkey between
2005 and 2009. It argues that the Europeanization process in Turkey, which
accelerated in the post-Helsinki period, has brought about some important
consequences concerning the recognition and expression of Kurdish identity. The
study examines Europe’s impact on the DTP through analysis of party documents
and interviews with party representatives, in order to investigate the meaning and
use of the European integration process in the DTP’s sub-state nationalist ideology.
This analysis shows that, although the Europeanization process in Turkey has
somewhat broadened opportunity structures for Kurdish sub-state nationalist politics,
overall the EU’s impact on the DTP’s nationalist politics has remained indirect and
limited.
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Sub-state nationalism has become one of the most remarkable political forces in the con-
temporary world, especially in the European context. The European integration process,
together with the processes of globalization, has significantly contributed to the rise of
sub-state nationalism. In this process, the opportunity structures that determine the
resources for and constraints on sub-state nationalist political activism have been
reshaped, mainly due to the transformation of the nation-state and the emergence of
new channels for regional assertiveness that are also utilized by sub-state nationalist pol-
itical actors. Sub-state nationalist actors, specifically political parties, have found the
process of European integration highly supportive for their purposes. European integration
has not only eroded the host states that are their main rivals in the nationalist struggle, but
it is also resulting in a reformation of Europe’s political structure (Guibernau; Csergo and
Goldgeier). Therefore, almost all sub-state nationalist parties in Europe have adopted a
pro-European stance, reformulating their discourse and identity to make use of these
new opportunity structures. More critically, they have come to frame their ultimate
goals in European terms, either as a “Europe of the regions” or “independence in
Europe.” As a result, the European integration process has brought about significant
effects on sub-state nationalist political parties.
Kurdish sub-state nationalism in Turkey has also been affected by the European inte-
gration process. EU-anchored democratization reforms in Turkey, which has been trying
to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria for full EU membership, have provided Kurdish
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nationalists with new channels of influence. Different strands of Kurdish nationalism have
sought to make use of the process to promote their nationalist cause. Interestingly, these
efforts have thus far received little scholarly attention. When not being investigated as a
case study in itself, Kurdish nationalism has generally been studied as a problem of terror-
ism threatening Turkey’s domestic political stability while badly affecting the Turkish
state’s relations with the international community, particularly the EU. In order to shed
light on the impact of the European integration process on Kurdish nationalism in
Turkey, this paper focuses on the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum
Partisi, DTP) as the major political representative of Kurdish nationalism between 2005
and 2009. Within the broader picture of the interaction between sub-state nationalisms,
nation-states and EU integration, it analyzes the impact of the integration process on
the DTP in terms of national identity construction, definition of goals, and choice of strat-
egies. Such an effort can also contribute to our knowledge of what happens to sub-state
nationalisms within the European integration process.
The European integration process as an opportunity structure
Sub-state nationalism is a broad category that describes movements and political parties
claiming the right to self-government within a demarcated territory (“homeland”), basi-
cally derived from the assertion of distinct ethnic/cultural identity and a common past
2 real or invented. Self-government itself generally refers to a kind of autonomy,
ranging from cultural rights to total independence (Beland and Lecours).
The fundamental claim of the initiators and supporters of this type of nationalism is
that state power is monopolized by a larger, dominant ethnic group, while their ethnic
group (which they claim to be a “nation”) is represented inadequately or not at all in
the existing political structure (Catt and Murphy 18). Sub-state nationalists therefore
organize themselves as social movements and political parties, adopting violent or non-
violent strategies, to challenge the existing state structure and the prevailing definition
of national identity. In this sense, it has a more oppositional characteristic than other
forms of nationalism. Nevertheless, like other forms of nationalism, it can be viewed as
a form of politics that seeks to maintain or gain the power that has come to be concentrated
in the state in modern times (Breuilly). Sub-state nationalism, as a form of politics cen-
tered on the politicization of ethnicity, has emerged as a response to changing circum-
stances, generally the centralizing and homogenizing efforts of nation-states, and the
conflictual consequences of modernization that can lead to a growth in ethnic awareness
(Newman).
In the emergence and development of sub-state nationalism, elites play a pivotal role in
terms of the politicization of ethnic identities and mobilization of the masses. Neverthe-
less, a political approach to sub-state nationalism should not understate the role of insti-
tutions, specifically those of the state, which, to a large extent, shapes the structure in
which sub-state nationalist movements emerge and develop (Lecours). For this reason,
this paper adopts a political approach that focuses on opportunity structures, which pro-
vides a valuable theoretical framework to explore the impact of European integration
on sub-state nationalism, as well as the emergence and development of sub-state nation-
alist challenges. Each sub-state nationalism is born into a particular context that not
only influences the way it emerges, but also defines the limits of opportunity structures
for sub-state nationalist political struggle and the strategies it can make use of. At the

































structures sheds light on their use in the process of the mobilization and framing of nation-
alist discourse by sub-state nationalist political parties.
The opportunity structure model, specifically the political opportunity model, as one of
the best-known models in the literature of social movements, includes only exogenous
factors that limit or empower oppositional collective actors (McAdam et al.; Tarrow).
This study, however, adopts a much broader framework, suggesting that an opportunity
structure includes the broader political environment in which sub-state nationalist politics
is embedded, and that it describes the distribution and structuring of internal and external
resources and constraints that make nationalist mobilization and activity more or less
likely (Hooghe 31). These resources and limitations are politically, economically, socially,
and culturally defined. That is, an opportunity structure is not only characterized in poli-
tico-institutional terms, but also includes economic and normative/moral aspects that are
ethno-culturally framed in nationalist discourse. It has two main interlocked dimensions:
internal and external.
In analyzing sub-state nationalist movements and parties, the internal dimension cor-
responds to endogenous factors such as the strength of ethnic identity, the political
program and policy stances, organizational capacity, leadership, the existence of debil-
itating intra-party cleavage, financial and human resources, links with social movements
and voters, and media coverage (De Winter 222–35; Van Houten 16). The external
dimension includes national (state) and international (extra-state) factors, also termed
environmental or exogenous factors. National and international factors interact with
each other in a dynamic atmosphere, which influences the opportunity structure for
sub-state national mobilization. The most critical national factor in shaping the opportu-
nity structure is the political regime, with its constitution, party system, and electoral
system.1
International factors, a major exogenous influence, consist of the changed nature of
international systems, the development of supranational organizations, and the demon-
stration effect of sub-state nationalist movements in other countries. While this is not
an exhaustive list, it includes some of the most important factors that shape opportunity
structures. Such environmental factors are of critical significance, since they together sub-
stantially affect the prospects for sub-state nationalist movements.
Beyond these factors, however, a reliable analysis of sub-state nationalism should not
overlook the significance of critical events and issues for sub-state nationalist mobilization
and activity. According to Birch (72), “eruptive” or “fomenting factors,” by instigating
sub-state nationalist conflict, are vital to capture mass support. Fomenting factors,
serving as economic, political and ideological resources, may be positive or negative
social, economic or political changes. For instance, within the context of Turkey’s
Kurdish case, the increased repression of Kurdish nationalist movements following the
1980 military coup was a significant factor fomenting Kurdish sub-state nationalist mobil-
ization and activity.2
In short, a focus on opportunity structure can be considered to be valid for at least two
reasons. First, through its political, economic and moral/normative dimensions, the oppor-
tunity structure model acknowledges how, to a great extent, the environment within which
sub-state nationalism develops is determined by the state, which still constitutes the center
of power resources, albeit remarkably transformed due to integrative processes. Second,
this model allows for the inclusion of an extra-state dimension into the analysis,
thereby recognizing the impact of contemporary events and politically or economically

































The significance of the European integration process as an opportunity structure
A great majority of sub-state nationalist parties today have a pro-EU stance, since they
conceive of European integration as a process reshaping opportunity structures to their
advantage in two main ways. First, the emergence and development of the EU, the
most remarkable and current form of European integration, as a supranational organization
has changed the nature of the national dimension of opportunity structures by transforming
the nation-state. Second, sub-state nationalist parties see the EU as a polity-making actor
that expands opportunity structures to their advantage by forming new institutions and
programs, providing funds, and enabling transnational alliances across the European
continent.
It is clear that nationalism has proliferated and undergone significant changes within the
European integration process (Csergo and Goldgeier), and sub-state nationalist parties have
made use of the new advantageous opportunity structures in many respects. Yet, the poten-
tial and impact of these new structures should not be exaggerated. It is true that sovereignty
is no longer undivided and that territorial borders have become porous, but power continues
to lie primarily with the nation-state (Mann; Suny). Regional governments, some of which
are controlled by sub-state nationalist parties (e.g. the Scottish National Party in Scotland),
have only been able to influence Europe if they have power in their host states, since access
to power occurs through, rather than beyond, the nation-state. Furthermore, as long as
member states are “masters of the treaty,” the EU should not be expected to develop a
common policy or perspective on the “nationalities question,” which is still primarily a
national question. This means that, while nation-states have undergone a transformation
within the European integration process, they still persist, so the main location of sub-
nationalist power struggles remains the state because, as a form of politics, sub-state nation-
alism seeks power for the ethno-cultural group it seeks to represent. While full sovereignty
may not make sense in the new context, independent statehood still matters. As long as
nationalist politics, grounded in conflicts of identity and interests, exist, it is always possible
that ethno-culturally distinct groups without states will pursue some kind of autonomy,
ranging from cultural autonomy to full independence. That is, there is no guarantee that
they will be satisfied with an institutional structure falling short of independence. At the
same time, though, full independence may be a sincerely declared and pursued ultimate
goal, or just a trump card against the nation-state. Nevertheless, independent statehood
remains an appealing option, insofar as nation-states are tenacious and a “Europe of the
regions” is a far-fetched ideal.
Currently, therefore, the realization of sub-state nationalist ideals depends on a continu-
ous struggle against the nation-state and its officially constructed and reproduced national-
ism. Within the politics of nationalism, European integration functions mainly as an
external support system that provides sub-state nationalist parties with a more supportive
framework than the exclusively nationally defined opportunity structures of the past.
Kurdish nationalism in Turkey has not been free from the effects of these new
dynamics, especially considering the Europeanization process carried out through
reform packages in Turkey. The next section analyzes effects of the Europeanization
process on the Kurdish question on which Kurdish nationalism is based.
The Turkish nation-state, the EU, and the Kurdish question in the post-Helsinki
period
Since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Kurdish nationalism has been one of

































national society. A sense of Kurdish nationalism has been nurtured by the ethno-political
Kurdish question,3 as a consequence of the denial and suppression of Kurdish identity by
the Turkish state (Cornell). While the opportunity structures for Kurdish nationalism were
highly restrictive for decades, democratization reforms initiated in the post-Helsinki
period, especially between 2002 and 2005, have provided the Kurdish nationalist
movement with new opportunities for promoting the recognition of Kurdish identity by
broadening the political system and enabling Kurdish nationalism to compete with
various forms of Turkish nationalism, including the official state version.
The post-Helsinki period has been significant in many respects, since the acceptance of
Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership at the Helsinki summit in 1999 marked a “categ-
orical jump” regarding Turkey’s relations with the EU. In addition to that, the cessation of
large-scale violence after the capture of PKK leader Öcalan provided Turkey with a new
opportunity to handle the Kurdish question in a non-military way.4 Thus, the Turkish gov-
ernment introduced a series of constitutional amendments and harmonization packages in
order to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria.5 While the accession process has proved
to be a key anchor in supporting democratization and modernization in Turkey, this
“unprecedented” reform process has also brought about remarkable improvements regard-
ing the recognition of Kurdish identity.6 The third reform package of August 2002 made
particularly crucial changes by allowing teaching of Kurdish in private institutions and
broadcasting in languages other than Turkish (Ulusoy). Moreover, in 2002, Turkey
ended emergency rule in its largely Kurdish southeastern provinces, and ratified certain
parts of the international law dealing with minority rights and cultural rights.7 This
period also witnessed the start of broadcasting in Kurdish by the state TV channel
(TRT) in 2004. Even though this was for no more than half an hour a day, its symbolic
importance was very significant. These openings have been recently followed by the estab-
lishment of 24-hour broadcasting on a new Kurdish-language state TV channel (TRT 6),
and the opening of a Kurdish language department at Mardin Artuklu University.8
As Turkey has undergone an unprecedented and profound transformation in the post-
Helsinki period, the EU has played an anchoring role as an external support system. There
is no doubt that both the EU’s severe criticisms of Turkey’s previous insistence on a mili-
tary solution to the Kurdish question, and its imposition of political criteria to be met for
Turkey to start accession negotiations, have been influential factors that forced or encour-
aged Turkey towards democratization. Yet this is not to suggest that the EU has or could
act as the principal, let alone the only determinant of the transformation of the Kurdish
question. Rather, domestic factors have been the main determinants of change. First, by
forcing the PKK to suspend armed conflict with Turkish security forces, the capture of
Öcalan provided a somewhat more appropriate context for democratization reforms, par-
ticularly regarding the Kurdish issue. Secondly, the election in November 2002 of the AKP
(Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or Justice and Development Party), a “pragmatic-conservative
and Islam-sensitive party” (Cizre 1), finally provided Turkey with a single-party govern-
ment with a clear parliamentary majority following a decade of fragile coalitions. Support-
ing a civic conception of nationalism, the AKP government has argued for a redefinition of
Turkish national identity without any ethnic connotations. Thirdly, a thriving civil society
has contributed to the reform process by opening various channels of dialog for the
expression of different aspects of the Kurdish question.
Within this process, compared to the influence of domestic factors, the impact of the
EU on the efforts for a reconceptualization of the Kurdish question has been limited, and
the EU’s proposals for a solution to the Kurdish question have remained rather vague

































Commission has called for a “political and non-military solution to the problem of the
southeast,” without specifying what such a solution entailed. Instead, it simply stated
that “a civil solution could include the recognition of certain forms of Kurdish cultural
identity and greater tolerance of the ways of expressing that identity, provided they do
not advocate separatism or terrorism” (Tocci, “The Europeanization of Turkey’s
Kurdish Question” 122). The EU’s concrete proposals for the solution of the Kurdish ques-
tion have faced two main problems. First, any EU proposal is made within the scope of its
approach to the protection of minority rights,9 and both the Turkish state and Kurdish
nationalist have opposed this, albeit for different reasons. According to the Turkish
state, minority groups in Turkey were determined by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923,
so any attempt to define the Kurds as a minority is artificial and malicious. Kurdish nation-
alists, meanwhile, wish to be defined as one of the constitutive elements of the Turkish
state, rather than as just a minority group. Second, the EU sees states as monolithic
political entities that cannot be obliged to sign up to international treaties or conventions
related to minority rights. That is, the EU lacks the legal power to compel a state to recog-
nize any minorities within its boundaries,10 and it is also difficult for the EU to uphold a
common policy on minorities or sub-national groups, since the issue of national minorities
is still overwhelmingly “national.” In this sense, the idea of state rights remains intact, and
the principle of state sovereignty can be still used to make persuasive arguments against
national minority rights (Jackson Preece 173).
Turkey’s official view of the Kurdish issue has changed from denial to recognition of
Kurdish identity, even if this is not yet constitutionally entrenched, and EU-anchored
democratization reforms have significantly contributed to this process. However, the
EU’s efforts to categorize the Kurdish question within the normative framework of min-
ority rights have been rejected by both Turkish and Kurdish parts for different reasons.
Changes in the official view of the Kurdish question and democratization reforms have
relatively broadened the opportunity structures for Kurdish nationalists, but legal
Kurdish politics still faces significant obstacles. For instance, according to the Law on Pol-
itical Parties, the use of languages other than Turkish remains illegal in political life. In
addition, even when they are not engaged in violent activities and do not extol violence,
political parties still run the risk of dissolution. Equally importantly, for regionally-based
Kurdish parties, the 10% national election threshold to enter the Turkish Parliament still
constitutes a huge obstacle to a just representation system.
The next section focuses on the impact of European integration on Kurdish sub-state
nationalism through an analysis of the DTP as the major legal political party of Kurdish
nationalism between 2005 and 2009. It explores the impact of the European integration
process on various aspects of the DTP, taking into consideration the party’s uneasy inter-
action with the Turkish state and Turkish nationalism.
The DTP: identity, goals, strategies and ideology
Turkish modernization has led to seemingly contradictory consequences: on the one hand,
it has contributed to a growing awareness of Kurdish identity among Kurds; on the other
hand, it has promoted the integration of Kurds with other ethnic groups in Turkey (Akyol).
Thus, although the great majority of Kurds have become integrated with the rest of the
country, mainly due to internal migration and interethnic marriages, it has also gradually
become an open secret that today it is impossible to assimilate the Kurds into Turkishness
(Oran). Kurdish ethnic demands have, to a great extent, been kept alive by Kurdish nation-

































Kurdish nationalism dates back to the nineteenth century, and had an ethno-religious char-
acter in the 1920s and 1930s, it appeared as a modern nationalist movement in the 1960s,
before turning into a mass movement in the 1980s (McDowall). The post-1980 phase has
witnessed the acceleration of Kurdish identity formation, mainly due to state repression,
long-term mobilization and the Kurdish diaspora in Europe (Bozarslan; Hirschler).11
Although there have always been alternative voices within it, Kurdish nationalism in
Turkey has been dominated by the PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, or Kurdish
Workers Party) since the early 1980s.
The PKK’s stated aim in the past was to create an independent Kurdish state of
Kurdistan, to consist of parts of southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, northeastern
Syria and northwestern Iran. Its original ideological foundation was a combination of
Marxism-Leninism and nationalism (Gürbey and İbrahim), although it somewhat
reduced its emphasis on Marxism after the fall of the Soviet Union. In recent years, its
focus has shifted from ethnic secessionism to obtaining equal cultural and democratic
rights, and the recognition of Kurdish identity in the Turkish Constitution (Özcan). Never-
theless, although its principal goal seems to have shifted from achieving a separate
Kurdish state to “democratization of the Turkish Republic,” it has never relinquished
the strategy of violence. Apart from the violent actions of the PKK, the PKK-linked
political parties have, since the early 1990s, sought to persuade the state to recognize
Kurdish identity, and accordingly restructure the political system.
The DTP, founded in 2005 as the latest in the chain of Kurdish nationalist parties
before the current Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP), has
been linked to the PKK. It emerged from the merger of the Democratic People’s Party
(Demokratik Halk Partisi, DEHAP) and the Democratic Society Movement (Demokratik
Halk Hareketi, DTH). The DTH was founded by Leyla Zana, Orhan Doğan, Selim Sadak,
and Hatip Dicle, who were all imprisoned between 1994 and 2004 for their pro-Kurdish
nationalist activities (“Pro-Kurdish politics”). By incorporating DEHAP, which dissolved
itself in order to join the DTP, the DTP aimed at a broad participation of all those Kurdish
nationalists willing to endorse a new democratic autonomy project. Although the DTP
presented itself as a nation-wide party, it was principally a regional party, in terms of
both the focus of its program and its popular electoral support.12 It was the dominant pol-
itical representative of the Kurdish nationalist movement until its dissolution in 2009.13
Deliberately rejecting the use of the concept of nation, the DTP instead asserted that
the “40 million–strong Kurdish people,” primarily living in four countries, constitutes
one of the historical peoples of the Middle East.14 Kurdish history and culture, and
especially Kurdish as an Indo-European language, are considered to be the main elements
of a distinct Kurdish identity. Against the Turkish state’s systematic policy of denial of
the existence of a Kurdish ethnic group, the Kurdish national community has been histor-
icized through ethno-historical myths, especially regarding the pre-Islamic period.15 The
DTP has strongly emphasized and used language and festivals such as Newroz as ethnic
boundary markers.16 Since Kurdish nationalism emerged as a reaction to assimilation, the
ethnic color of Kurdish national identity has become more obvious. Nevertheless, this has
not led the DTP to support an exclusive definition of Kurdishness. Rather, the DTP has
pursued an official recognition of Kurdish ethnic identity and accepted Türkiyelilik
(“being a member of Turkey”) as a politico-territorial supra-identity that can cover all
ethnic groups living in Turkey. Regarding the identity issue, the territorial dimension
of Kurdish identity is a contested issue. In particular, the “map dispute” over the territor-


































The DTP’s sub-state nationalism can be specified more closely by taking into consider-
ation its social democratic position. As an observer political party to the Socialist
International and the Party of European Socialists, the DTP has combined traditional
nationalist policies of self-government with a post-industrial agenda. Positive discrimi-
nation for women, the protection of the ecological balance, and sustainable economic
development were some of the party’s polices reflecting its left-of-center position
(DTP, Party Program).
In terms of its political goals, the DTP’s specificity compared with its predecessors lies
in the policy of “democratic autonomy” that was entrenched in the party’s regulations in
2007. According to the DTP, the Kurdish question arose because the Turkish Republic
denied its foundational principles with the 1924 Constitution, in which the Republic
denied its actual ethnic and religious diversity for the sake of creating a homogeneous
Turkish nation, although it had been founded through a true collaboration of various
Anatolian peoples. Thus, according to the DTP’s analysis, the Turkish Republic has
been an anti-democratic state since the 1924 Constitution, which symbolized a “temporal
turn” for the Kurdish people whose existence was denied.18 The DTP believed that the
subsequent constitutions of 1961 and 1982 served to worsen the situation.
On the basis of this premise, the DTP argued that the Kurdish question has been one of
Turkey’s major problems, and that it could only be solved through extensive and real
democratization. Rejecting a separatist agenda, the DTP claimed to be struggling to
“establish the brotherhood of peoples and democratic co-existence on the basis of equality
and freedom” (DTP, Party Program 16).19 However, it is hard to see any consistency in
terms of the solutions it offered. Its demands for democratization of the Turkish Republic
occasionally referred to a federation of Turks and Kurds, thus an ethnically re-structured
state, or to gaining cultural and language rights within the unitary state structure (DTP,
Party Program 34; DTP, Democratic Society Party’s Project 50–55). Its project of a
democratic solution to the Kurdish question was eventually concretized as “democratic
autonomy.” In accordance with the policy of democratic autonomy, the DTP’s goal of
democratization of the republic is based on a kind of territorial autonomy as well as the
constitutional recognition of the Kurdish people through a series of cultural and political
rights, especially education in the Kurdish language (DTP, Democratic Society Party’s
Project). Regarding state institutions, the party argued that the over-centralized Turkish
political and administrative system should be subject to a process of devolution towards
a comprehensive regionalization. Regions, including the region of “Kurdistan” in south-
eastern Anatolia, should have regional parliaments formed through elections. They
should be competent in all areas except for foreign affairs, defense, and finance, and
they should share authority with central government in the judiciary and police services.
Organized as people’s assemblies, these parliaments should also enable real participatory
democracy (DTP, 2nd Extraordinary Congress Final Declaration).20
The DTP has adopted various electoral strategies in order to attain its goals. The DTP
received a significant percentage of Kurdish votes in Turkey, concentrated in southeastern
Anatolia.21 Because its supporters are regionally concentrated, the DTP, like its predeces-
sors, has maintained a strong foothold in local governments – winning, in this case, nine
provincial municipalities.22 Until 2007, local governments were the center of the DTP’s
sub-state nationalist politics, but when the party managed to enter the Turkish Parliament
by surmounting the national election threshold obstacle indirectly, the DTP parliamentary
group became the focus of the party’s self-government claims until its closure in 2009.23
Compared to its counterparts in the EU, the DTP could only benefit from quite narrow

































intra-party cleavages, and its links with the PKK that limited its room for maneuvering.
One could argue that the DTP emerged as an outcome of the Kurdish nationalist movement
yet suffered from being a movement party.24 That is, as a movement party, it has been a
coalition of political activists who have diverged on the proper solutions to the Kurdish
question and the best political strategies to pursue. The party can also be characterized
as an alliance of “doves” and “hawks,” with the former advocating a solution to the
Kurdish question within a unitary state system, and the latter insisting on Kurdish demo-
cratic autonomy. While the doves have been condemned by the hawks as pacifist and con-
ciliatory, the doves have criticized the hawks for pursuing an ethnically-based federation
(“DTP’de Nurettin Demirtaş”). Such intra-party cleavages essentially prevented the party
from developing a complete, stable collective preference schedule. Furthermore, because
it was never transformed fully into an institutionalized political party, the DTP conducted
dual-track activism by combining activities within the arenas of formal democratic com-
petition with extra-institutional mobilization. Thus, it became an ordinary sight to witness
DTP legislators debate bills in parliamentary committees one day, and participate in
disruptive demonstrations the next.
The DTP’s other main problem was that it suffered from an inability to distance itself
from the PKK. The DTP’s leadership occasionally stressed that the party had common
grassroots with the PKK25 and called on the state to negotiate with the PKK to solve
the Kurdish question. However, this undermined the reason for their autonomous existence
in parliament. For instance, Emine Ayna, the DTP deputy leader, clearly stated that the
state’s real interlocutor regarding the Kurdish issue was the PKK, demanded a general
amnesty for all PKK militants, including Öcalan, and suggested that the PKK had to be
invited to take its place in the Turkish parliament if the government was sincere about
finding a solution.26 Indeed, despite his imprisonment, Öcalan has kept his significance
for the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey. As a part of this movement, the DTP
also frequently referred to his “leadership.” While the party’s “Mr. Öcalan” policy under-
lined its link with the PKK,27 some of party supporters’ revealing posters of Öcalan in DTP
congresses became one of the main elements of their symbolic struggle against the state.
Even though it is incorrect to see the DTP as the political wing of the PKK, there is never-
theless some kind of link between the two.28 This link with the PKK has not only put extra
constraints upon the party in a relatively narrow political opportunity structure, it has also
become one of the major hindrances to further democratization steps in Turkey.
The EU as an external support system for the DTP
Two basic facts determined the limits of EU support for the DTP’s sub-state nationalism.
First, since Turkey is not a member state of the EU, the DTP was deprived of many chan-
nels open to other sub-state nationalist parties in member states. Secondly, there are no
established regional authorities through which the DTP could differentiate itself from
other regions at the national or EU level. Thus, unlike its many counterparts in EU
countries, the DTP lacked a favorable institutional framework for both paradiplomacy
and transnational cooperation with other sub-national actors in the EU.29
Nevertheless, it is still reasonable to argue that the DTP benefited from the EU-
anchored democratization reform process in Turkey. While party members rightly
claimed that any solution to the Kurdish question could be solved within domestic
dynamics,30 the DTP also stressed the importance of the EU membership process for
the general purpose of democratization in the country (DTP, 2nd Extraordinary Congress

































European Council meeting in December 2004, a group of Kurdish intellectuals and poli-
ticians, including some members of DEHAP who later participated in the establishment of
the DTP, expressed various demands to the Turkish state. Defining the Kurdish question as
a fundamental problem hindering Turkey’s accession to the EU, the declaration empha-
sized that “Turkey must guarantee its Kurdish citizens the same rights the Basques,
Catalans, Scots, Lapps, South Tyroleans and Walloons enjoy in the democratic countries
of Europe, . . . a new and democratic constitution, recognizing the existence of the Kurdish
people, and guaranteeing it the right to a public school system and media in its own
language and the right to form its organizations, institutions and parties with the aim of
contributing to the free expression of its culture and its political aspirations.”31 This
declaration clearly showed early expectations from Turkey’s EU integration process.
There is no doubt that since then, democratization reforms have provided the Kurdish
movement, specifically the DTP, with new and genuine political opportunities.
In the 1990s, governments occasionally mentioned the “Kurdish reality” in Turkey,
and the need for a peaceful solution to it. One political leader, Mesut Yilmaz, even
made a clear connection between finding a democratic solution to the Kurdish question
and Turkey’s accession to the EU.32 However, such statements did not yield any palpable
results. Unlike these fruitless expressions of the 1990s, AKP governments, especially
between 2002 and 2004, implemented critical political reforms in the name of Turkey’s
EU bid. Consequently, democratization reforms as a part of the Europeanization
process have both directly and indirectly affected perceptions and definitions of
Turkey’s Kurdish issue.
Recognizing that the PKK’s violent strategy empowers the same status quo–oriented
actors who are also opposed to the AKP, and using the opportunity to end large-scale con-
flict in southeastern Turkey following the capture of Öcalan, the AKP government rede-
fined the Kurdish question primarily as a problem of democracy rather than security.
This crucial step of desecuritizing the issue conformed with the party’s comprehensive
attempts to civilianize Turkey’s political system. Various EU-anchored democratization
reform packages lifted the state of emergency that had been in force in southeastern pro-
vinces since 1987, and dramatically reduced the power of the National Security Council
through which the military had been able to exert a strong political influence. As well
as curtailing the military’s effect on political life to a remarkable degree, the AKP govern-
ment’s reform packages also allowed some significant individually-based cultural rights
for the Kurds. These reforms mainly extended cultural rights by enabling education and
broadcasting in Kurdish. On the other hand, these amendments failed to abolish the
village guard system, permit Kurdish as a language of instruction in public schools, or
reduce the 10% threshold for general elections. Even so, the reforms have been of great
significance since they reflect a paradigmatic change in the Turkish state’s view of the
Kurdish issue. Despite significant constraints, such as a clear ban on ethno-politics in
the Parliament, these reforms have paved the way for allowing the representation of
Kurdish demands by a pro-Kurdish political party in the national assembly for the first
time in republican history. Therefore, it was no less important that a pro-Kurdish political
party, the DTP, was able to form a parliamentary group in the national assembly in 2007
thanks to the relatively more democratic atmosphere, at least compared to previous years
when it was taboo even to speak of Kurdish identity or the Kurdish question.
Deprived of the opportunity structures provided by EU institutions, the DTP frequently
sought to make use of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in the Council of
Europe, where it was able to articulate its demands in the Congress loudly and to attract

































Diyarbakir Sur Municipality and subsequent prosecutions by the Turkish state. The
Congress formed a fact-finding mission (Bureau of the Congress) to investigate local
democracy and the situation in Sur Municipality, after which it prepared detailed
recommendations to Turkey.33
Despite its continued significance for the DTP, the EU gradually lost its status as
primary external support system for various reasons. First, because the PKK has been
on the EU’s terrorist organizations list, European countries demanded that the DTP
declare it would cut its links with the PKK,34 which the party could not accept. The
EU’s demand, in line with Turkey, that the DTP denounce PKK terrorism led the party
to question what the EU could contribute to its strategy.35 The EU’s vagueness regarding
its solutions to the Kurdish question may not have eventually conflicted with the DTP’s
territorial autonomy-based solution. However, the EU’s policy of viewing the PKK as a
terrorist organization was apparently incompatible with the DTP’s perspective. Second,
Turkey’s EU accession negotiation process was losing impetus, and it was unclear
whether Turkey would eventually become an EU member, since the process had been
defined as open-ended in the 2004 European Council meeting. This open-endedness has
not only negatively affected Turkish efforts towards democratization; for the DTP, it
has also decreased the credibility of the EU’s perspective. More critically, empowerment
of Kurdish regional autonomous authority in northern Iraq by Western powers has contri-
buted to the revitalization of the ideal of a Greater Kurdistan,36 or at least it has broadened
the opportunity structures so as to force the Turkish state to become more accepting of
Kurdish demands within Turkey.37
In sum, EU-anchored democratization reforms have brought about an unprecedented
change in Turkey’s political system.38 Although certain constraints remain for pro-
Kurdish politics, the opportunity structures have broadened to include the recognition
of Kurdish identity with the provision of a number of cultural rights by the Turkish
state. While the party supported the EU as an external support system, the EU implicitly
demanded that the DTP turn into a truly institutionalized political party that competed for
elections. As it turned out, the DTP, like its predecessors, was unable to survive very long.
Its closure in 2009 by the Constitutional Court of Turkey has not only highlighted the con-
tinuing difficulties facing Kurdish nationalists, but it has also raised questions about the
true depth of the apparent transformation of Turkey’s political system towards a more
democratic structure.
Concluding remarks
The contentious relationship between sub-state nationalism and the nation-state has
become more intricate within the European integration process, which provides a new
opportunity structure for sub-state nationalist political parties. Although the great
majority of these political parties uphold the process, their support should not be seen
as constant and unconditional. The European integration process serves as an external
support system to enrich sub-state nationalist strategies. In the same way, the DTP, as
a sub-state nationalist political party, supported the EU integration process for offering
external support to broaden the party’s opportunity structures. The analysis made here
shows that the EU’s impact on the DTP’s nationalist politics has been indirect and
limited. It is true that the DTP was able to obtain relatively broadened opportunity struc-
tures as Turkey has undergone reform to meet the Copenhagen criteria in the post-Hel-
sinki process. However, the EU’s impact on the party has been predictably limited.

































open to other sub-state nationalist parties in member states. Furthermore, Turkey still
has a highly centralized politico-administrative system that lacks established regional
authorities through which the DTP could differentiate itself from other regions at the
national and EU levels.
The DTP sought to make use of various platforms in European political architecture
and civil society to attract attention to the Kurdish question in Turkey and get political
support for the Kurdish nationalist cause, especially in 2004 and 2005. However, the
EU integration process did not create sufficient transformation in the party to allow it to
denounce the PKK’s violent strategy. While the party articulated self-government
claims within an individual rights–based perspective and a post-industrial agenda, thus
enhancing its social democratic stance, it ignored the EU’s calls for the party to explicitly
denounce PKK’s violent strategy. Hence, the EU gradually ceased to be of primary signifi-
cance as an external support for the DTP.
Within the context of the opportunity structure model, the European integration
process as an external factor has provided the DTP with some significant benefits.
However, the failure of the AKP’s “Kurdish opening,” the DTP’s inaction in this
process, and the eventual closure of the party show that there are serious constraints at
internal and state levels on the opportunity structure that hinder the taking of significant
steps towards a solution to the Kurdish question and the legal political representation of
Kurdish nationalism.
Recognizing the Kurdish question as the major problem of Turkey, the AKP started an
initiative in August 2009 that has been the most courageous attempt to address the problem
so far. At first called the “Kurdish opening,” this was renamed the “national unity project”
due to criticisms from different strands of Turkish nationalism. Besides policies to provide
more capital to the region to improve economic development, and enhancement of
Kurdish cultural rights, the most assertive aim of the “Kurdish opening” was the disarming
and disbanding of the PKK to terminate the Kurdish insurgency.
Unfortunately, the “Kurdish opening” soon failed. Having been unable to develop pol-
icies independently from the PKK, the DTP and its successor BDP have shown the PKK as
the true interlocutor in negotiations on the Kurdish issue, thereby undermining their own
existence as legitimate political entities. Despite aiming to eventually disband the PKK,
the AKP has consistently rejected the idea of negotiating with it, as this would equate
to political suicide for the party. The DTP could have been a mediator between the
PKK and the state, but this might have led to recognizing the AKP’s significance in
Kurdish constituencies. The “Kurdish opening” failed not only because the exclusion of
Kurdish nationalists decreased any chance of a comprehensive solution, but also
because of fierce reactions from both opposition parties and within the AKP’s own consti-
tuencies. This led the party to abandon the political risk of continuing the opening on the
eve of the 2011 general elections, which would have critical consequences in terms of
drafting a new constitution and holding presidential elections. Furthermore, the AKP
found decreasing the 10% national electoral threshold to be against its interests, as such
a reform could have been used by the opposition to claim that the AKP had facilitated
the involvement of Kurdish nationalists in the Parliament. At the same time, it would
have diluted the AKP’s majority by allowing more parties to gain parliamentary represen-
tation. Eventually, fading prospects for full membership to the EU, the fierce reaction from
the opposition and large sections of electorates conditioned for decades to view the ques-
tion as just a matter of terrorist separatism, and pragmatist political calculations on the eve
of the elections all combined to discourage the AKP from taking decisive steps in its

































campaign in 2011, the AKP promoted “one state, one flag, one language” – in complete
contradiction to the “democratic autonomy” policy of Kurdish nationalists.
Ironically, the AKP’s “Kurdish opening” coincided with the closure of the DTP by the
Constitutional Court of Turkey on 11 December 2009. The Court decided to close down
the party for becoming a “focal point of activities against the indivisible unity of the state,
the country, and the nation.” (“Anayasa Mahkemesinin”).40 The failure of the AKP’s
“Kurdish opening” and the closure of the DTP have together shown that even when
Kurdish nationalists try to act through legal politics within the Turkish political system
they still face a highly narrow opportunity structure that is critically shaped by state-
level and internal factors.
Notes
1. The type of electoral system is a major factor in determining the type of political party system.
While proportional representation would benefit sub-state nationalist political parties by raising
their parliamentary representation, in majoritarian systems voters may refrain from voting for
parties that are unlikely to win any seat (Catt and Murphy). In addition to the relative openness
or closure of the institutionalized political system, the state’s capacity and propensity for repres-
sion affects opportunity structures. McAdam et al. (10) also note the importance of the presence
and stability of elite allies.
2. The Franco dictatorship in Spain and the discovery of oil in Scotland can be given as examples
of fomenting factors from different contexts (see Saylan).
3. As an ethno-political question, it has various dimensions including cultural rights, socio-
economic underdevelopment of largely Kurdish areas (southeastern Turkey), high levels of
unemployment, and terrorism (see Keyman).
4. Upon his capture in Kenya, Öcalan was brought to Turkey 16 February 1999. He was sentenced
to death; his sentence was later commuted to life-long imprisonment without parole when the
death penalty was abolished in Turkey in August 2002.
5. Tocci (“Europeanization in Turkey”) convincingly argues that there is no linear relationship
between domestic change in Turkey and EU conditionality. She claims that domestic change
has been spearheaded by domestic actors that have used and been strengthened by the external
EU anchor (see also Ulusoy).
6. The realignment in domestic politics, the increasing effect of a flourishing civil society, and
some signs of an alteration in the military’s perspective of the Kurdish question (for the
signals from the military see Bila).
7. Nevertheless, Turkey has kept its sensitivity about the recognition of any minorities other than
those recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne. For example, it only ratified OSCE conventions
with certain reservations grounded in this attitude (for details see Sarıgil 186–87).
8. The Institute of Living Languages at Mardin Artuklu University, hosting a department of
Kurdish as the first institution of Kurdish language at the university level, was opened in 2009.
9. The European Commission’s Turkey 2005 Progress Report, Criteria for Membership: Human
Rights and Protection of Minorities, states that “The minorities usually associated by the auth-
orities with the Treaty of Lausanne are Jews, Armenians and Greeks. However, there are other
communities in Turkey, which, in the light of the relevant international and European standards,
could qualify as minorities” (35).
10. For instance, France, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg have not ratified the
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities prepared by the Council of Europe since
1995 (see Phillips).
11. For a detailed analysis of political activism in the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, see Eccarius-
Kelly.
12. Neither the Turkish Constitution of 1982 nor the Political Party Law allows the establishment of
political parties on ethnic or regional grounds.
13. Kurdish nationalist activism is reflected in the workings of human rights organizations, cultural
associations, political parties, self-help organizations, local administrations, and movements of
different political stripes, ranging from the traditional Left to Islamic movements. Therefore, the

































pro-Kurdish political parties are HAK-PAR (Hak ve Özgürlük Partisi, or Rights and Freedom
Party) and KADEP (Kadep Katilimci Demokrasi Partisi, or Participatory Democracy Party).
Unlike the DTP, both of these parties openly reject the use of violent methods, yet they both
back an ethnic-based federation of Turks and Kurds.
14. The population of an ethnic group seeking self-government is often a matter of speculation for
competing parties. The numbers, “40 million Kurds, 25 million of whom live in the territorial
boundaries of the Turkish state,” were uttered in the author’s interview with Ahmet Türk, 21
January 2009. Nevertheless, many public opinion polls show that almost 15% of the population
in Turkey identify themselves as Kurds. According to the results of two different research projects
conducted by KONDA, there are nearly 11–12 million Kurds living in Turkey (2 million
in Istanbul); see “Kürt Meselesini Yeniden Düşünmek” [“Rethinking the Kurdish Issue”]
Konda Reports 2010. http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2010_12-KONDA_Kurt_Mesele
sini_Yeniden_Dusunmek.pdf. Web. 18 Jan. 2012; “Kürtler ve Kürt Sorunu” [“The Kurds and
the Kurdish Issue”] Konda Reports Nov. 2008. http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2008_11_
KONDA_Kurtler_ve_Kurt_Sorunu.pdf. Web. 18 Jan. 2012.
15. For a detailed analysis of Kurdish intellectuals’ efforts to create a Kurdish ethno-history, see
Hirschler.
16. For the construction and the use of Newroz as an ideological means for mobilization by Kurdish
nationalists, see Aydın.
17. Although the DTP has never expressed irredentist claims, Kurdistan maps used in the party’s
congresses, meetings or conventions have often displayed a “Greater Kurdistan” that included
Kurdish sections of Iraq, Iran, and Syria. For an exemplary incident about the “map dispute”
see “Parka Kürdistan Havuzu Yaptırdı.” DTP Kayapinar Mayor faced charges DTP Kayapinar
Mayor faced charges for for building a Kurdistan-shaped pool. The pool was demolished and its
construction also became one of the charges leveled against the party in the subsequent closure
case. See also “DTP’nin nevruzunda Kürdistan haritası skandalı” and “Diyarbakır’da tartışmalı
harita!”
18. See for instance, DTP Vice President Ayna as quoted in “Ayna: Atatürk’ün Verdiği Sözler
Tutulmalı” [the promises given by Atatürk should be kept].
19. The DTP’s vision of European integration is consistent with this view. As a left-wing mass
party, it supports the idea of a “People’s Europe” against the “Europe of businessmen.” This
emphasis implies not only an egalitarian social understanding, but also a view that European
integration is seen as the proper political framework for the peaceful co-existence of peoples
in a democratic Europe (DTP, Party Program 49–50).
20. The BDP, current successor to the DTP, continues this policy. Osman Baydemir has recently
summarized democratic autonomy as meaning that “the Kurds would have a parliament in
southeastern Anatolia and fly their flag next to the Turkish flag”. “Baydemir sparks debate
with Kurdish ‘Kurdish flag’ remarks.” Today’s Zaman 2 August 2010. Web. Gülten Kışanak,
co-chair of the BDP, has stated that the party has been already implementing the model of demo-
cratic autonomy in municipalities held by the BDP mayors. She argues that the BDP strengthens
civil society in the name of a participatory democracy by establishing women’s, youth, and
neighborhood assemblies. “A Road Map to Democratic Autonomy.” Bianet 5 September
2011. http://bianet.org/english/minorities/132501-a-road-map-to-democratic-autonomy. Web.
18 Jan. 2012.
21. Based on the criterion of “language spoken with mother at home,” Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu
identified Kurdish electors as making up 12.8% of total 42 million electors in Turkey in
2007. In other words, there were about five million Kurdish electors in Turkey in 2007. The
Independents whose major force behind it was the DTP obtained 1,822,253 votes (5.19% of
total votes) in 2007 elections (“Türkiye Geneli Seçim Sonuçları.” http://secim2007.hurriyet.
com.tr/partidetay.aspx?pid=1. Web. 18 Jan. 2012) while the party had 5.68% of total votes
with 2,271,566 votes in 2009 local elections (“Seçim 2009.” http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/
english/election2009/election.html. Web. 18 Jan. 2012). Even if it is hard to estimate the
exact number of Kurdish voters in Turkey, one can still suggest in the light of these figures
that votes for the DTP roughly ranged between 35% and 45% of all Kurdish votes.
22. The DTP won 99 municipalities in the recent 2009 local government elections. Nine of the 99 are
provincial capitals: Diyarbakır, Batman, Hakkari, Iğdır, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli, Bingöl and Van
(“Election results by provincial assemblies.” http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/election2009/

































23. In order to overcome the 10% national threshold, the DTP formed a platform of independent
candidates in the 2007 general elections, winning 21 seats in the Turkish Parliament. As a
result, since 2007, the DTP, now the BDP, has had a parliamentary group in the national assem-
bly (see ‘Kurumsal Yapı’ at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/arsiv.htm. Web. 18 Jan. 2012). This is the
first time in the history of Turkey that a pro-Kurdish political party has formed a parliamentary
group.
24. For detailed information about movement parties, see Kitschelt.
25. The statement by Ahmet Türk, the DTP’s leader, read: “Tabanımız dağda” [“Our grassroots is in
the mountain].” Sabah, 22 April 2006. Web.
26. “Emine Ayna says that the PKK, Öcalan key to peace.” Hürriyet Daily News 12 August 2009.
Web.
27. To illustrate, the DTP organized a mass meeting in Diyarbakır in 2007 under the name of a
“Mr.Öcalan meeting” (Hürriyet, 25 Nov. 2007). DTP MPs often referred to Öcalan as “Mr.”
in their interviews and speeches to emphasize that they saw him as respectable and key to
solving the Kurdish question. To illustrate, Sabahat Tuncel, Istanbul MP of the DTP, said
“Sayın Öcalan’ın fikri alınmalı” [“Mr.Öcalan’s opinion should be sought”] Yeni Şafak 1
March 2008; Aysel Tuğluk, Diyarbakir MP of the DTP, said “Çözümün muhatabı Sayın Öca-
lan’dır” [“The addressee for the solution is Mr. Öcalan”] Radikal 28 August 2009. Web.
28. A report prepared by the European Union Institute for Security Studies states that “it is an
obvious secret that DTP is connected to PKK in a way, and the PKK is a terrorist organization”
(“EU Report: DTP is connected to PKK ‘in a way’.” http://www.worldbulletin.net/index.php?
aType=haberArchive&ArticleID=8226. Web. 18 Jan. 2012.
29. The DTP had a representation bureau in Brussels that basically lobbied EU institutions about
Kurdish rights in Turkey (author’s interview with the DTP Brussels representative, Fayık
Yağızay, 2 April 2008, Brussels). The DTP’s representation’s effectiveness has been highly
limited because of unfavorable institutional design in Turkey. Unlike its many counterparts in
Brussels, this office was officially unable to represent Kurdish sub-national identity and
interests.
30. Author’s interviews with Ahmet Türk (DTP’s leader) and Bengi Yıldız (DTP’s MP for Batman),
21 January 2009, Turkish Grand National Assembly.
31. For the full text of the declaration, see Institut kurde de Paris.
32. “Yilmaz: the road to EU passes through Diyarbakir,” Turkish Daily News 17 December 1999.
Print. Diyarbakir is a mostly Kurdish-populated province in southeastern Turkey.
33. Although Recommendation 229 does not have any compelling power on Turkey, it is still a valuable
document since it shows that Turkey needs to undergo a comprehensive process of decentralization
or devolution. “The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities - Recommendation 229 (2007)
Local Democracy in Turkey.” https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.
instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=1691602&SecMode=1&DocId=1167298&Usage=2.
Web. 18 Jan. 2012.
34. Interview with the ambassador of Germany to Turkey (see “‘PKK ile bağınızı koparmalısınız’”).
35. DTP MPs occasionally criticized the EU’s stance on the Kurdish question. However, the harsh-
est criticisms have come from Öcalan, the PKK’s leader, who has been in prison since 1999. His
statements since 2005 coincide with the official view of a foreign conspiracy dimension to the
Kurdish question. For instance, Öcalan claims that the Kurdish question is a trump card in the
hands of Europe. European countries do not really want to see the Kurdish question solved; they
carry on policies that contribute to the protraction of the conflictual situation. Europe is an old
enemy of Turkey. Turkey mistakenly believes it can solve the Kurdish question with European
assistance. The Europeans wanted to use the PKK, but they were rejected by the PKK; so the
Europeans put the PKK on the list of terrorist organizations. “Avrupa Kürt kartını oynuyor”
[“Europe plays the Kurdish card”]. Online Gündem 10 February 2007. Web.
36. For instance, the declarations of Kurdish authorities in Northern Iraq regarding the right of
Kurds living in neighboring countries to self-determination fueled the debate. Barzani, the pre-
sident of the Kurdish regional government in Iraq, stated that when the time comes, Kurds in
Turkey and Syria would naturally use their right to self-determination. “Saldırı olursa kendimizi
koruruz” [“We shall defend ourselves if we are attacked by”]. Hürriyet 3 February 2007. Web.
This pan-Kurdish perspective of the Kurdish authorities in Iraq was also accompanied by
declarations by DTP representatives emphasizing a pan-Kurdish solidarity. For instance,

































branch leader declared that any attack on Kirkuk would be tantamount to an attack on
Diyarbakir. “Kurdish leader charged with controversial remarks.” Turkish Daily News 24
February 2007. Web.
37. In the volatile circumstances of the region, Turkey has gradually changed its policy with respect
to the Kurdish regional government in Northern Iraq, which has brought about an apparent
improvement in relations. Consequently, the Kurdish authorities emphasized the importance
of maintaining good relations with Turkey by gradually playing down the pan-Kurdish dimen-
sion of their policies.
38. Turkish governments have occasionally made declarations about a “Kurdish reality” and the
importance of finding a democratic solution to the Kurdish question in terms of Turkey’s EU
bid. However, until the recent reforms, none of these declarations had resulted in material
actions.
39. One should here mention two recent articles, both of which focus on the failure of the AKP’s
“Kurdish opening” in interaction with the process of Europeanization in Turkey. Kirişci right-
fully argues that as the EU’s engagement with Turkish full membership has been weakened, the
EU has gradually lost its transforming capacity on Turkish politics, including on the Kurdish
question. Thus, reform-minded political and social actors, most importantly the governing
party, have become deprived of a critical support in facing the rising nationalist backlash in
Turkey against the EU-anchored political efforts to find a democratic solution to the Kurdish
question. In the same way, Somer and Liaras emphasize EU-related causes as a significant
factor for fierce reaction from both the opposition and the government’s own constituencies
to the “Kurdish opening.” Differently, they observe a limited amount of normative change on
the Kurdish question among religious conservatives, largely represented by the AKP, despite
the party’s reformist image.
40. On its closure, the ex-DTP MPs, except for the two having lost their MP status (Ahmet Türk and
Aysel Tuğluk), joined the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP),
which is the current successor to the DTP.
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